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REPLY
THE FRAGILE PROMISE OF PROVISIONALITY
JAMES S. LIEBMAN* & CHARLES F. SABELt
It is a pleasure to address such well-informed, insightful and well-
intentioned responses to our Article. Intellectual predispositions and differing
assessments of the prospects of reform aside, it is striking that so many
participants have firsthand experience of the new model school, the new politics
in all their mystery, and even non-court-centric judicial review.' It is clear that
something is afoot, and not just in academic circles, when observers as different
as Diane Ravitch, the critic of Deweyan latitudinarianism, and Gordon Whitman,
the community organizer, are both surprised to discover that standardized testing
can go hand in hand with individualized education in improving schools for the
most vulnerable students. 2 In the main, therefore, we are engaged in an
intramural discussion about how to characterize and assess the developmental
possibilities of a new species of public institution whose mere appearance
confounds traditional taxonomies.
Because reactions to this novelty nonetheless strongly reflect the educa-
tional, political or policy, and legal expertise of the respondents, we divide our
own necessarily selective commentary accordingly. We begin, however, with a
compressed restatement of our core argument, emphasizing what we take to be
its most attractive institutional feature: the ability to make progress on apparently
intractable problems even in the absence of anything like a fully specified
concept of the eventual solution or a rich consensus on the ultimate goals of
education.
I.
REPRISE OF OUR ARGUMENT
We argue first that the new architecture of educational reform has emerged
from the fusion of a top-down national movement for standards and bottom-up
* Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
I Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. See infra notes 2, 18, 43, 52, 79 and accompanying text (discussing examples of the new
reforms observed by Mumane, Elmore, Ravitch, Hochschild, Adams, Whitman, and Hershkoff &
Kingsbury).
2. Diane Ravitch, Comments on Liebman and Sabel: A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353, 356 (2003) (discussed infra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text); Gordon Whitman, Making Accountability Work, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 361 (2003) (discussed infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text).
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initiatives, some of the latter associated with Deweyan .progressivism.3 A key
feature of the reform architecture is its use of error-detection to compensate for
design deficiencies. No one initially knows how to build a school system that
enables poor and minority students to read and do mathematics at levels attained
by rich white students. But following experimentation, error-detection and
correction at the lowest levels to find out what works, higher level structures can
be adjusted to generalize what is learned and encourage more refined error
detection, and so on.4 With regard to reading, for example, all students learn by
some idiosyncratic combination of decoding strings of letters/phonemes
(phonics) and derivation of the meaning of words and sentences from context
("whole language" method). 5 Teachers in the new system identify the strengths
and weaknesses of each student's mixture of strategies by sampling their skills in
brief, daily sessions, and suggest improvements. The performance of students in
the same grade then is measured periodically statewide by a standardized test,
allowing for the comparison of the performance of teachers within classrooms,
schools, and districts. 6 The job of principals is to create conditions in the school
for generalizing the successes of the most effective teachers, and the job of the
principals' superior-the district superintendent-is to create conditions for
diffusing the successes of the most effective principals. 7
In this way the reformed school system is invented through the piecemeal
but eventually comprehensive improvement of a crude but serviceably
provisional starting structure that supposes only the broadest, non-vapid agree-
ment on goals and methods. The goal is that educational achievement by main-
stream measures should not vary across groups in culturally salient hierarchies,
and gaps should be closed by leveling up, not down. The method is that teachers
must aid students to improve their individual bundles of learning strategies, and
administrators must aid teachers and other administrators in doing this.8
We claim further that a precondition of these educational changes is the
politically consequential diffusion of a new calculus of consent. People disserved
by the current system are sufficiently aggrieved by the resulting costs that it is
worth their while to coalesce to disentrench established interests, provided that
there is a minimally acceptable prospect of success and accountability.9 The
diffusion of this new calculus of consent goes hand in hand with the creation of
what we tentatively call "the new publics": new forms of community-based
organization that pressure individual schools and districts, and civic and
3. James S. Liebman & Charles Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
183, 214 (2003).
4. Id. at 219.
5. Id. at 218.
6. Id. at 221.
7. Id. at 219.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 267.
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professional associations and business groups that pressure the courts, the
legislature, and the political class generally.
10
We argue, third, that the federal No Child Left Behind Act11 (NCLB) is the
legislative reflection of all of these changes taken together. Despite important
limitations, the Act obliges states to create the kinds of governance and reporting
mechanisms that at least in some instances are likely to set in motion the bottom-
up reconstruction of schools directed towards the goal of closing the
achievement gap. 12 Above all, we take the NCLB, like the institutional reforms
that it triggers, to be provisional and corrigible in the light of the initial isolated
successes that it encourages.
13
Finally, we argue that courts can, but need not, play an important role in
coordinating the articulation of systemic reform at both the state and national
levels. 14 To do this, however, courts---emulating in their own way the innova-
tions of the Texas Supreme Court in the Edgewood suite of decisions-1 5 -will
have to reform their own role in superintending the reorganization of complex
institutions in the name of constitutional values. 16 Instead of themselves revising
the new rules of a reformed school or delegating this task to a group of experts
and parties convened for the purpose of such rulemaking, the courts will have to
oversee the process by which schools, the interests most affected by schooling,
and civil society in general collaborate in the process of devising and period-
ically correcting performance standards and metrics for measuring progress
under them. 17
With these ideas recalled to mind, we turn to the reactions of those most
knowledgeable about the internal mechanisms, results and political background
of school reform: the education experts.
II.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM
Only a fool dismisses a friend's concern for her well-being. And given
Professor Murnane's evident and welcome sympathy for our general position,
his two worries are especially weighty.18 One, reflecting Murnane's work over
the last two years with the Boston public schools, is that, successful as current
10. Id. at 267-71.
11. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
12. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 283.
13. Id. at 299.
14. Id. at 278.
15. See, e.g., Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 493-94
(Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
16. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 280.
17. Id. at 280-83.
18. Richard J. Murnane, Standards-Based Educational Reforms: Progress, but Enough to
Sustain Momentum?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339 (2003).
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reforms are compared to earlier reform Waves, they are not so overwhelmingly
successful as to be self-validating. In particular, the slow gains they produce may
not immunize the reforms against the intentional or unintentional effects of belt-
tightening in hard times. 19 The second concern, reflecting Murnane's experience
as an economist, is that bad incentives disincentivize reform efforts, and that it is
all too easy in constructing standards-based governance systems to misspecify
incentives or to create spurious data for evaluating performance relative to
them.20
Murnane's concern about the slow pace at which the achievement gap is
being closed and the consequent inability to secure politically self-reenforcing
success is a deep concern and one we fully share. Melissa Clark's finding,
reported in her contribution to this Symposium, that Kentucky's governance
reforms (but not, interestingly, its recent fiscal redistribution) have closed one-
third of the achievement gap between black and white students without changing
the situation of students in poor districts relative to those in rich ones gives an
idea of what has, and has not, been accomplished. 21 But such results are not of
course a show-stopping argument or proof of the inevitable failure of reform. We
insist on what might seem a pettifogging distinction between deep concern and a
show-stopping demonstration of futility because we can do something about the
worries that beset us but not about an ineluctable fate.
Professor Murnane naturally knows this, as his exceptional and deeply
admirable engagement with the Boston schools demonstrates. His concern for
this problem and his reaction to it seem to us exemplary. And indeed crafty
readers who scope out exchanges of the present sort by reading from back to
front would be well-advised to read his essay first, for it captures better than
anything we wrote the precarious race between renewal and disaster charac-
teristic of the current moment in school reform. Bearing in mind this precarious-
ness, or if you will, this upper bound to optimism, we think it is nonetheless
possible to respond to many of the more specific concerns about the reform
program raised by Murnane himself and the other commentators.
Murnane's worry about incentives is easier to address. A precise account of
the problem of mistaken incentives, which Professor Murnane himself sup-
plies,22 is often a first and crucial step towards correcting the mistakes. For
example, if year-by-year sampling of student performance in some class of
schools is demonstrably unreliable, there is a strong argument for relying on
moving averages of performance or other devices for more reliable assessment. 23
Similarly, if incentives discourage teachers by unreasonably penalizing them for
19. Id. at 342.
20. Id. at 339-41.
21. Melissa Clark, Response to A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 311 (2003).
22. Murnane, supra note 18, at 340-41.
23. A variety of experts and other interested actors are currently addressing exactly these
kinds of measurement issues. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 211-14 & nn. 119, 124.
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failing to produce an absolute level of student performance, rather than (as in
Texas) rewarding them for achieving some appropriately contextualized rate of
improvement, there is good reason to switch from the former method to the
latter.24
We understand that even apparently sophisticated arguments about incentive
structures can be connected to simple, even simple-minded and ideologically
tinged, beliefs about, for example, the need to punish teachers or students who
"irresponsibly" fail to meet "reasonable" social demands. But given side-by-side
examples of incentive systems that work by inducing actors to achieve the
desired results and ones that fail to do this, we think there are good chances that
officials and citizens will often choose the effective system, rather than the one
that corresponds to their unreflective expectations about how an incentive system
"should" work. Recall that Texas-which we are treating here as in some sense
the nation in microcosm-started out with an extremely crude "No Pass, No
Play" system of incentives, which penalized individual students for institutional
failures. Yet, Texas eventually developed a sophisticated system for the
improvement of whole institutions judged against their peers.25 Clark notes
similar capacities for major course corrections in her review of Kentucky's
experience under its educational reform act. 26 The current national crazy quilt of
good and bad incentive systems should make it easier (although hardly
inevitable, given familiar problems of public choice and unintended consequen-
ces) for school systems nationwide to learn today what Texas and Kentucky
learned in the last two decades.
Elmore's concerns are related. He too suggests the success of reform is
balanced on a knife's edge: The devil is in the details, he says. 27 This conviction
goes hand in hand with the idea that successful reform must result from process
of organic quasi-spontaneous adjustment that allows the uniquely workable
solution to win out over its rivals.28 Against the backdrop of these assumptions,
Elmore naturally sees the NCLB as a ham-handed effort to force a transfor-
mation that must develop by its own rhythms and devices. By thus overtaxing
the current fragile capacities for reform, the Act will destroy invaluable seeds
that would have borne fruits if left without this kind of attention.29
We think Elmore's own detailed and compelling account of New York
City's District 2 belies both assumptions he makes here about the character of
the reform process. 30 On the basis of our reading of his account of District 2,
24. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 241 (discussing Texas's incentive structure).
25. Id. at 239-43.
26. Clark, supra note 21, at 312 (discussing revisions made to Kentucky's testing scheme in
response to complaints that it did not effectively measure improvement and could be gamed).
27. Richard Elmore, Details, Details, Details, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 318
(2003).
28. Id. at 316-17.
29. Id. at 317.
30. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 224-26, 291-92 (discussing the work of Professor
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2003]
N. Y U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
therefore, we come to different conclusions about the potential of the NCLB.
Recall that in Elmore's account of District 2, organic experimentation did not
lead to anything approaching continuous systemic reform, any more than it had
in the precursor schools founded by Deborah Meier in a neighboring New York
City school district. It took the imposition by superintendent Anthony Alvarado
of an accountability regime focusing on closing achievement gaps for at-risk
populations to transform District 2 from a district that produced master teachers
to a district that actually succeeded at teaching at-risk pupils.
3 1
Furthermore, the governance and accountability regime created by Alvarado
was not fixed once and for all. On the contrary, it both enabled local
experimentation and continued to be reshaped by it over the years.32 Seen this
way the successes of District 2 were neither knife-edged nor organic. And, as we
describe in our main Article, they were not knife-edged--dependent upon
discovering a uniquely correct solution from the start-in part because of the
particular ways in which they systematically, not organically, allowed for
recovery from mistakes.33
Still from this perspective, Alvarado mandated the equivalent of the NCLB
in District 2. Assuming arguendo the validity of this comparison, it is hard to be
quite so vehemently opposed to the Act as Elmore is here. In fact, he seems to be
reacting to the NCLB less as the leading expositor of the architecture of the new
school reform and more in the manner of Alvarado's chronic doubters: veteran
master teachers who saw the need for systemic reform in principle but doubted
that it could be accomplished in practice by others less sensitive to the mysteries
of learning than themselves. 3
4
Professor Elmore may turn out to be right in practice about the effects of the
NCLB. We can't agree to Mumane's upper bound on optimism without
accepting as much.35 But we would be more willing to accept Elmore's assess-
ment if it were grounded in a fuller evaluation of the range of innovative con-
texts beyond District 2 that seem capable of generating reform,36 and an account
of the NCLB itself that was more consistent with his own writings on the reform
process up until now.
Professor Ravitch's remarks provide an additional reminder that favored
assumptions are a poor guide to evaluating situations that are open and designed
to be opened further.37 Her assumptions are the opposite of Elmore's. She thinks
that any reform with a progressive ancestor is doomed to failure. So, New York
City's District 2 is doomed once because of its connection to Deborah Meier and
Elmore and his colleagues).
31. Id. at 217-26.
32. Id. at 227.
33. Id. at 220-21.
34. Id. at 221.
35. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 231-66.
37. Ravitch, supra note 2.
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doomed again because of Meier's connection to John Dewey.38 Professor
Ravitch seems unable to see what Elmore documented: that District 2 deserves
to be at least as known for data-driven reforms of the kind she herself stumbled
upon and came to admire based on a chance encounter in a Boston suburb as for
any Deweyan progressivism.
39
Ravitch's account of how teachers in that suburb, still superficially irritated
by standardized tests, had come to see them as a valuable device for focusing
attention "like a laser" on the weakest groups is especially interesting here
because it is an example of just the possibility that Elmore and many other critics
besides seem to dismiss: a positive unanticipated (not directly planned) response
to standards-based governance reforms.40 Like Ravitch, we do not think that
such changes will always "occur automatically or easily.' 41 But ideological
lineages aside, we certainly agree with the lesson she draws from her Boston
experience that "the potential for change is surely there." 42
III.
REFORM POLITICS
We turn now to the politics of school reform, starting with a response-
Professor Hochschild's-that puts more precisely than we did the puzzles posed
by the success of the reforms so far, however fragile their future may prove. 43
Like us, Professor Hochschild thinks that the reformers' success in dislodging
entrenched interests cannot be accounted for by "conventional political wis-
dom." 44 So we need new, unconventional explanations that enlarge our sense of
political possibilities. But she presents the theoretically baffling circumstances in
a way that generously underscores this shared conclusion while diverting
attention from confusions and omissions in our own presentation of the problem.
To help orient the research that we all agree that these questions urgently
demand, we quickly review our account of the politically perplexing aspects of
the current reforms and show how her version corrects and improves it.
At bottom, our argument was simply that under the pressure of the growing
education crisis, dissatisfied professionals-some high education officials, many
more professionally revolted teachers-coalesced with some combination of
community-based organizations and high-powered business-backed civic groups
to throw the bums out.45 Hochschild points out that there in fact was no general
38. Id. at 354.
39. Id. at 355-56.
40. Id. at 356.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Jennifer L. Hochschild, Comments on James Liebman and Charles Sabel, A Public
Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 327 (2003).
44. Id. at 327.
45. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 267.
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perception among US citizens of an educational crisis of the sort that this
argument naturally supposes. Nor was this a matter of indifference or ignorance.
For example, in the last 20 years or so, changes in the results of nationwide tests
have been at least as assuring as alarming. 46 Where there was incontestably a
crisis-in inner-city schools-the response was stinting at best.47
But while the public pressure for reform in this direct sense was almost
surely less than we suggested, the possibilities for institutional obstruction of the
reform movements were probably greater. Thus, Hochschild points out that
despite affirmations of the need for reform by high-ranking officers of the teach-
ers unions, school-level union officers and the rank and file in the classrooms
have responded to innovation by charging "violations of the union contract and
filing grievances that prevent reforms."
48
Similarly, it is hard to see why politicians from either party would have
joined a movement to make schools and ultimately the political system
accountable for reforms in favor of at-risk students. Hochschild reminds us that,
partisan affiliation aside, acceptance of accountability is not a distinguishing
mark of politicians. What's more, the Democratic Party is beholden to unions
that are in de facto opposition to reform. And the Republicans have little to gain
from governance reforms revealing that the groups most served by the school
system just happen to be those whose parents do not typically vote Republican.49
Finally, it is clear, as Hochschild also observes, that the sophistication of the new
publics invoked in our description of the reform process is only a concomitant or
effect of the successful politics of reform and certainly is not an independent root
cause of it. 50
So, assuming, as both Hochschild and we do, that the reforms are for real,51
just how did the apparently resistible force of reform dislodge the apparently
immovable object of traditional self-interest? Sharpened by Hochschild's
comments, this is a really good question. Without the substantial empirical
research surely required to answer it, we can only return to a hunch that grows
out of our understanding of developments in Texas and Kentucky. The hunch is
reinforced by Adams' account of why previous reform cycles failed, while the
work of the Prichard Committee in the latter state and other groups has
unexpected staying power. We thus suspect that the new accountability systems
lower the bar for reform-reduce, if you will, the amount of force needed to
overcome the inertia of traditional bureaucracy-by allowing the politicians,
professionals, and public alike to commit themselves to reform without commit-
ting themselves to any particular reform once and for all and maintaining
46. Hochschild, supra note 43, at 327-28.
47. Id. at 328.
48. Id. at 329.
49. Id. at 330.
50. Id. at 331; see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 271-72.
51. Hochschild, supra note 43, at 330; see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 272.
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credibly that they can learn from failure as well as success. 52
Gordon Whitman's thoughtful analysis of the role of community-based
organizations in school reform53 suggests that even those who approach the
problem of new publics and new politics on the basis of extensive grassroots
experience are as much at sea in these matters as the rest of us. Whitman makes
two points. The first is that, as the role of the Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing
Project in the continuing reform of the McClure School in Philadelphia shows,
community-based organizations can sometimes turn New Accountability
systems to the advantage of their constituents-and this although such
neighborhood organizations traditionally avoided public education issues. 54
Second, Whitman emphatically joins us in warning that absent some independent
community-based power with the capacity to assess-and if necessary redirect-
the restructuring of local schools, the long-term prospects of sustained reform in
the interest of at-risk students are dim.55
But having concretized the promise of community-based participation in
reform and underscored the dangers of proceeding without it, Whitman breaks
off before posing the questions that immediately press themselves on those, like
us, who fully accept his framing of the problem: Just how are community-based
organizations supposed to make use of and enlarge the current possibilities for
participation? Community-based organizations, including many of those that
Whitman names, are skilled at using a mobilized membership to intimidate local
power elites to give the organizations' leaders the proverbial seat at the table.
Until now, however, they have not needed and thus have not mastered the
capacity to train their members to participate in the day-to-day restructuring of
institutions that the new reforms require. How should the recruitment and
training methods of traditional community-based organizations change in
response to this challenge? What about their mechanisms of assuring
accountability with respect to their constituents and the wider public? What
about their choice of alliance partners and their understanding of the demands of
partnership? In particular, how will they cooperate with professionals, whose
expertise is indispensable to evaluating progress under the new system, without
becoming hostage to them? 5
6
52. Jacob E. Adams, Jr., Results or Retrenchment: The Real Race in American Educational
Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 305 (2003). As Adams puts it, the new reforms
"enable[] policy refinements within a coherent public commitment to student performance... and
demonstrate[] that success depends as much on how we manage the process as it does on the
attributes of policy." Id. at 310. For convergent conclusions, see CLARENCE N. STONE ET AL.,
BUILDING CIVIC CAPACITY: THE POLITICS OF REFORMING URBAN SCHOOLS 161-62 (2001) (cited by
Professor Hochschild, supra note 43, at 331).
53. Whitman, supra note 2.
54. Id. at 362.
55. Id. at 364.
56. The best discussion on this point from the community-based perspective remains Michael
Katz's decade-old article on the background of current school reforms in Chicago. Michael B.
Katz, Chicago School Reform as History, 94 TCHRs. C. REc. 56, 61 (1992). In this piece, which
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From discussions with leaders of community-based organizations, we know
that all of these questions are today regarded as legitimate and sometimes even
as urgent: Given the experience of the Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing Project
at the McClure School and the other developments that are noted both in
Whitman's response 57 and our original Article, 58 it could hardly be otherwise.
But the salience of such questions makes the absence of anything like a sustained
internal debate on these matters all the more puzzling and troubling. For it raises
the worrisome prospect that, somehow stuck in their ways, the traditional
community-based organizations about which Whitman writes may prove to be as
incapable of adjusting to changed circumstances as conventional trade unions in
the United States and elsewhere have sadly shown themselves to be. But night is
always darkest just before the dawn, and we truly hope that we are overlooking
in Whitman's response and in the broader canvas on which he draws the first
traces of a new participatory light.
IV.
REFORMING LAW
Having faced the darkness, we are ready to face the lawyers' gloom. They
share the other respondents' worries about the fragility of the reforms and the
fickleness of the public but have none of the hope that comes from seeing
justice, against all odds, being done at times in schools and classrooms. In part,
perhaps, this pessimism reflects their general situation. The last years have not
been kind to left liberals, and they have been especially unkind to left liberal
legal academics. 59 But the pessimism mainly reflects our failure to convince
them of the way in which the joint evolution of school reform and judicial
vindication of the right to an adequate education may renew their transformative
Whitman rightly calls "brilliant," Whitman, supra note 2, at 364 n.7, Katz initially assimilates
school reforms to familiar social movements for civil rights and environmental protection. But he
goes on to observe that
[R]ecent social movements have called on a new body of alternative experts. Whether
they are protesting the environmental impact of an expressway, the dangers of a nuclear
power plant, or the impact of urban renewal on affordable housing, activists require
data. They need it not only to argue for alternatives but, as well, to challenge the experts
supporting the agencies and institutions they oppose. Alternative experts based in
advocacy groups, new institutes, and universities now provide them with sophisticated
support. At first, reliance on experts seems to contradict the demystification of
professionalism and "objectivity" and the emphasis on grass-roots citizen participation
and control at the core of urban social movements. The point, though, is more subtle,
for recent social movements are helping to redefine the meaning and role of
professionals and expert knowledge rather than to simply reproduce conventional
relationships between knowledge and action. This redefinition, however, remains
experimental, inchoate, still lacking clear formulations and models.
Katz, supra, at 61.
57. Whitman, supra note 2, at 361.
58. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 275.
59. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, The Chastening of Critical Legal Studies (Review of MARK
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)), 71 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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projects. So, here we go again.
Professor Tushnet, to begin with, makes two divergent, not to say
contradictory, points. The first is that there is less to school reform than what we
present to the eye. 60 The second is that we offer no strategy for infusing the
broader "democratic experimentalism" that helped underwrite these allegedly
inconsequential reforms into judicial and other politics.6 1 We think that this
ambivalence--deriding democratic experimentalism as ineffectual but wishing,
too, that it become politically effective, if not dominant-grows out of deeply
rooted confusions in Tushnet's broad understanding of the current moment in
constitutional politics. After a word about the empirical status of the reforms, we
will try to try to clarify that understanding from our point of view.
Tushnet complains that we hide repeatedly behind the word "emergent" to
suggest that the reforms are about to be more developed than any observer not
from Cloud Cuckoo Land would allow.62 He is right about the overuse of the
word, but the criticism goes to a defect of style not substance. We use
"emergent" to stand for something close to "more change than is theoretically
cognizable given current theory but not so extensive that the new paradigm is
unquestionably stable." Notice that, even while underscoring how difficult it is
to progress, none of the educational specialists raises question about the extent or
profundity of the changes so far. Their worries and ours concern the effects of
efforts, like the NCLB, to dramatically quicken the pace of change especially in
areas that have been slow to innovate on their own. It is true that we have not
given ethnographically or analytically compelling accounts of the micro-
mechanisms by which, say, higher-level frameworks such as statewide curricu-
lum or standardized tests are revised in the light of lower-level experience with
their diagnostic capacities in schools, districts and classrooms. But, as we argue
in our original Article, the shift from the TAAS to the TEKS tests in Texas and
the recent legislation requiring schools and districts to monitor the achievement
gap in Kentucky are certainly evidence that large-scale corrigible experimentalist
frameworks exist.63
Now to Tushnet's ambivalence. Tushnet began his academic career as part
of the Critical Legal Studies movement. 64 Like the other "Crits," Tushnet
believed that the law is a kind of screen or shade covering the window of
politics.65 Stripping aside the drapery of law, one could peer through the window
60. Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 357 (2003).
61. Id. at 358. On democratic experimentalism, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
62. Tushnet, supra note 60, at 358. See generally ARISTOPHANES, BIRDs (Jeffrey Henderson
trans., Focus Classical Library 2d ed. 2003) (414 B.C.).
63. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 249-50, 265, 266.
64. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Consitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
411,424 (1981).
65. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328
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and see the conflicts and power struggles that are the real stuff of social life.66
The familiar slogan "law is politics" called attention to what is really
important. 67
In his most recent writings, Tushnet has come to grips with the fact that
politics, far from being a window into or the very seat of social vitality, has itself
been immobilized. Familiar changes in party structure, campaign finance, and
congressional redistricting produce a gridlock: Despite increasingly vociferous
ideological clashes, -neither party is able to achieve major reform.68 The
Democrats cannot extend the New Deal administrative state, but neither can the
Republicans systematically dismantle it. 69 Notwithstanding appearances of a
rightwing putsch by the Rehnquist Court, Tushnet contends that the peculiarities
of the process by which Supreme Court Justices are appointed make the Court
more likely to ratify this gridlock than to tip the scales in favor of either side or
to use congressional immobilism to impose its own will.70
The big projects characteristic of the New Deal and the Great Society--dear
to Tushnet's heart, as well as the hearts of many non-Crit left liberals who saw
the Warren Court as the guarantor of positive social rights-are consequently off
the table. 71 One of the very few strategies still open to would-be reformers,
therefore, is democratic experimentalism, which Tushnet has recently called "the
most promising candidate for a theory of government activity in the new
constitutional order."72 Because it is in some ways an incrementalist reform
strategy, and because, as we have seen, democratic experimentalism escapes
conventional ideological categorization, democratic experimentalism can work
even if-perhaps even because-traditional partisan politics is gridlocked. 73
The problem, of course, from Tushnet's point of view, is that democratic
experimentalism is very much a second-best strategy, inherently inferior to the
big New Deal and Great Society projects that are no longer feasible.74 At times,
this seems like very thin gruel. And at other times it promises to be more
nourishing provided it is pursued more energetically and with greater political
sophistication than heretofore. 75 Tushnet's response here wavers between these
(1990) (reviewing SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989)).
66. Id. ("One could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's bottom-
line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at the platforms of
the Republican Party.").
67. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 14-38
(1999).
68. Id. at 14-38.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 28-35.
71. Id. at 30-35.
72. Id. at 172.
73. Id. at 171-73.
74. Id. at 169.
75. Id. at 169-72.
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competing perceptions. 76
We think the story of education reform should cause Tushnet to rethink his
background understanding of political immobilism and the ambivalent view of
current reform possibilities that it suggests. In his story, gridlock emerges from
institutional corruption and a sheer clash of evenly-matched wills.77 But as we
understand the recent history of educational reform, clashing ideological
projects-more money for poor schools and pupils versus privatization of all
schools-led to a broad understanding on both sides that neither solution was
actually viable. Experimentalism arose not out of a desire to do something small
because nothing big was in the cards but rather from the realization that it was
necessary to learn from many small successes and failures in order to accomplish
large broadly-defined common goals. 78 From this point of view, democratic
experimentalism is not the second-best strategy, available to those who don't
have the political wherewithal to do what they know correctly to be right. It is
the strategy for citizens and courts to pursue when there is no clear strategy for
doing what practically and constitutionally needs to be done.
If we are right about this, then it follows that the best means for propagating
democratic experimentalism generally, and to the judicial elites in particular, is
surely not to organize an ideological counter-offensive to the Federalist Society,
as Tushnet would have us do. Instead, if democratic experimentalism really is a
promising (we nearly said "emergent") solution to the problem of substantive
exhaustion and not just a second-best accommodation to political gridlock, then
we ought to be identifying the actors, judicial and otherwise, who are edging
towards democratic experimentalism on their own. With them, we should try to
forge a common language that allows learning across domains, while addressing
the constitutional and legal problems that this shift in our democracy presses on
us in terms that engage non-specialist citizens. (We don't, by the way, claim we
are already pursuing this strategy with the dedication it would surely require. But
this, and not a counter-putsch, is the line of action consistent with our own
analysis.)
Is this a fool's errand? Do there actually exist the potential allies, inter-
locutors, and interested citizens that it supposes? With qualifications, Professors
Hershkoff and Kingsbury, two knowledgeable observers, seem to think so.79
Hershkoff and Kingsbury make two oddly disconnected points. Their res-
ponse begins by claiming that our proposals threaten certain rights of ascriptive
as opposed to voluntary groups in multicultural societies. 80 Recent discussion
76. Compare Tushnet, supra note 60, with TUSHNET, supra note 59.
77. TUSHNE, supra note 59, at 14-38.
78. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 207, 214-15.
79. Helen Hershkoff & Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network
Governance: A Response to Liebman and Sabel's Approach to Reform of Public Education, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 319 (2003)
80. Id. at 322.
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has not been kind to the concept of ascriptive groups' rights, but we leave it to
the interested reader to adjudicate this dispute. 81 The Hershkoff-Kingsbury
response ends with the argument that the experimentalist transformation of
education-reform litigation on which we focus is less novel than we think.
Rather, the changes we highlight are the expression of broad innovations by
traditional public interest lawyers, developing in the light of their own successes
and failures the framework that Abram Chayes years ago called "public law
litigation." 8
2
Presumably Hershkoff and Kingsbury would neither be praising the learning
capacities of the public interest bar, nor chiding us for imposing our program on
a movement that has anticipated our conclusions in its own terms, if they truly
thought those conclusions endangered vulnerable right-bearers. So we take their
remarks about our inattention to the reflexive capacities of the legal practitioners
as an informed, if roundabout, report that, pace Tushnet, 83 non-court-centric
litigation--or, more generally, democratic experimentalism 84 -is not alien to the
world of practice and legal politics because politically engaged public lawyers
are already inventing it. 8
5
With respect to the "folk" discovery of experimentalism-without which, of
course, it would be impossible to diffuse such innovations through alliances
rather than putsches 86-Hershkoff and Kingsbury are, we suspect, more right
than they know. In a related article, Sabel and Simon revisit Chayes' original
distinction between the "traditional" lawsuit and "public law litigation." 87 The
former typically involves two parties in a dispute over contractual obligations.
88
By contrast, the latter involves amorphous party structures, broad challenges to
the operations of large public institutions (school systems, prisons, mental health
facilities, police departments, and public housing authorities), and long-term
remedies requiring restructuring and monitoring of these institutions.
89
Despite some initial successes, public-law litigation was, as we saw in the
case of desegregation, widely criticized by commentators and the Supreme Court
for overtaxing the administrative capacities and doctrinal resources of the
81. For recent experimentalist interventions in the relevant debate, see Cristie L. Ford, In
Search of the Qualitative Clear Majority: Democratic Experimentalism and the Quebec Secession
Reference, 39 ALBERTA L. REv. 511 (2001); Kirsty Gover & Natalie Baird, Identifying the Maori
Treaty Partner, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 39 (2002).
82. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
Rev. 1281 (1976); Hershkoff & Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 325.
83. Tushnet, supra note 60; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85. Hershkoff& Kinsgbury, supra note 79, at 325.
86. See supra notes 70 & 78 and accompanying text.
87. Charles F. Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization Rights: How New Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with authors).
88. Chayes, supra note 82, at 1282-83.
89. Id. at 1283-84.
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judiciary.90 How could courts, the general argument ran, administer complex
institutional reforms when administrative agencies with the appropriate
mandates routinely failed to do so? How could courts in any case oversee such
reforms when in public law litigation, in contrast to contractual disputes, there is
no close doctrinal link between the infringed right and the remedy?91
Looking at contemporary suits involving the same public institutions
Chayes investigated, Sabel and Simon do indeed see consistent evidence of the
development of the public law framework to which Hershkoff and Kingsbury
allude. 92 Mirroring our own obstinate ostentation of novelty, however, Sabel and
Simon characterize these changes as a shift to experimentalist, or "new" public
law, and argue that this shift suggests revisions to Chayes' account of the public-
law process as well as responses to the critics.
93
Two linked examples of these revisions highlight the difference between the
old and new public law, and show how the latter generalizes claims raised here
in regard to the re-orientation of school-reform litigation. Chayes tended to
collapse the liability and remedial phases of public-law adjudication: The for-
mer, in addition to condemning the illegality of current circumstance, contains a
"prediction" of the corrective regime to be elaborated in the latter. 94 In our new
public law, the two phases are more distinct. The liability determination is open-
ended in that the remedial implications of a judicial finding of systemic wrong-
doing are indeterminate. 95 The finding of a right to an adequate education is just
such an open-ended liability determination.
96
This change is connected to a second in the remedial phase. Early public law
remedies were largely the work of an ad hoc group drawn by the court from
parties and outside experts. The group's chief task was to periodically monitor
the reforming institution through occasional reports, primarily addressed to the
judge, that comprehensively evaluated the institution's compliance with the
90. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 200, 280.
91. Id. at 200; Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 3-4.
92. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 7-38.
93. Id. at 5-7, 41-47. In his last work on international public law, Chayes himself described a
trend in that field toward arrangements of the sort we call experimentalist. ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). The book argues that sovereignty in this realm has come to
mean less the power to command from above and more the power to engage others in discussion of
what needs to be done. The book describes numerous international regimes of collaborative
standard-setting, monitoring, and continuous revision based in part on comparisons with the
experiences of others. Our project can thus be seen as revising Chayes' early efforts to understand
linked changes in the judiciary and the administrative state in the light of his later intuitions of a
more encompassing transformation of the character of democratic sovereignty.
94. Chayes, supra note 82, at 1294 ("The liability determination is not simply a
pronouncement of the legal consequences of past events, but to some extent a prediction of what is
likely to be in the future.").
95. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 51-57.
96. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 280.
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minimal standards. 97 In the new public law, monitoring is likely to be contin-
uous. It addresses not just the judge but the staff and clients of the reforming
institution, and often the legislature and public at large. Reports focus on the
status of constitutionally aggrieved groups in the light of key performance indi-
cators, rather than presenting a wholesale evaluation of institutional compliance
with legal requirements. 98
Together these changes may enable the new public law to address the
information-burden and rule-of-law concerns that dogged the old. The undis-
guised indeterminacy of the liability phase destabilizes the parties' pre-litigation
expectations, provoking political, cognitive, and psychological effects that
increase their disposition to experimentalist collaboration.99 In the subsequent
remedial phase, the regime of standards and monitoring encourages the parties to
learn jointly-and in ways inaccessible to traditional, bureaucratic administra-
tion-from what this disruption reveals. This learning incrementally reshapes
their legal obligations, allowing rights or ends to be reinterpreted in light of
effective remedies or means, and vice versa. So, the argument continues, the
openness of the finding of liability provides, in the new public law, a precon-
dition to establishing the link between rights and remedies that eluded the old.100
Of course, if we have mischaracterized the sources and implications of
changes in school-reform litigation here, it is likely that a generalization
influenced by this work will be misdirected as well. On the other hand, assuming
that we are not wholly blinded by our preconceptions, it is reassuring to find
developments in policing, public housing, and the like1°1 converging with the
findings in school litigation, and with assertions by Hershkoff and Kingsbury
that public law is evolving in a way that resonates with both. Just how to
interpret that evolution remains an open question-but it is an open question that
public interest lawyers in our view should be most concerned to answer.
Like Tushnet and Hershkoff and Kingsbury, Professor Minow is torn
between sympathy for our project and fear of being led down the garden path. 102
In the end, anxiety conquers, and she spends the bulk of her response raising the
reasonable concern that experimentalist reforms presuppose a consensus on
complex goals that is nearly impossible to attain in our profoundly pluralistic
society. 1
0 3
We agree for starters that the new education reforms will almost certainly
fail when the concerned parties have irreducibly antagonistic ideas of what
education or other such fundamental or citizen goods should be. All forms of
97. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 51-57.
98. Id. at 5-6.
99. Id. at 58-65.
100. Id. at 38-41; see also Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 282.
101. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 14-37.
102. Martha Minow, School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 333, 334, 338 (2003).
103. Id. at 336-38.
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self-government will fail under these conditions. But as we tried to show in our
main Article through the case studies of reform in Texas, Kentucky and New
York City's District 2 and in the passage of the NCLB, we don't think that such
irreducible antagonism is in fact characteristic of the debate about education (and
probably much else) in the U.S. 10 4 Rather, at least in part through the failure of
the traditional contrasting reform strategies, the current situation is marked by a
thin consensus admitting of and reinforced by experimentalist reforms.
The thin consensus is the one that we reprised at the outset of this rejoin-
der. 105 Whatever other goals education serves, it must reduce performance
disparities in reading and mathematics between at-risk subpopulations and the
dominant group. Vague and incomplete though it surely is, this consensus is also
robust enough to support wide-ranging reform. But it is the beginning, not the
end, of a process that will just as surely revise our understanding of the goals of
education as well as the means by which we pursue them.
Take as one example from the many conflicts among goals that Minow lists
the possibility of an intolerable trade-off between the regimentation of education
that equality-focused comparison of outcomes seems to require and the
encouragement of individual creativity that has long been a goal of progressive
education. 106 How, in advance of actually implementing the thin consensus, will
we know if there really is a such a trade-off and if so whether it is intolerable or
not? Experimentalist reform is a way of addressing these conflicts, not avoiding
them-and in the case of education, addressing them from a starting point that
has been democratically validated. Minow's concerns with the capacities of
various at-risk groups to participate in the ensuing conflicts are all well-taken.
10 7
But as Gordon Whitman's response suggests, and as we tried to show in
addressing like concerns above, the new reforms create possibilities for capacity-
building even if they do not ensure egalitarian outcomes. 
108
But thin as the thin consensus supposed by experimentalism is, it would be
meaningless if it included everybody. The response by powell and Spencer tests
its limits with regard to school reform. 10 9 Our disagreement with them is not
about ends. We think ourselves as committed to a fully deracialized society as
they are. 110 The difference between us concerns, rather, the apparently arcane
104. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 216-29, 231-65, 283-300.
105. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
106. See Minow, supra note 102, at 337.
107. See Minow, supra note 102, at 336.
108. See Whitman, supra note 2; supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. On the question
of the capacity of parents of at-risk children to participate in the reform of schools, it is comforting
to know that the new accountability regimes have inspired impressive manuals for using the data
the regimes generate to support a compelling demand for reforms. See, e.g., RuTH JOHNSON, USING
DATA TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2002).
109. john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Brown is not Brown and Educational Reform is
not Reform ifIntegration is not a Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343 (2003).
110. For deeply and currently held integrationist views that are, if anything, more strident
than those offered by powell and Spencer, see James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: All-Out
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matter of the relation between means and ends. powell and Spencer insist that the
global end--"integration" or the elimination of all disparities in the treatment of
persons of color-must be fully reflected in the choice of all the steps to that
goal.'' The aim of this strategy is to ensure as far as possible that incremen-
talism or stepwise change results in social transformation, not in incremental
embellishment of the status quo. But from our point of view, this strategy comes
at an unacceptably high price. For it excludes the continuing mutual adjustment
of means and ends that enables actors to discover what it is that they really want
and how best to attain it. 112 To see why, consider the commitments entailed by
powell and Spencer's "integration" program.
At bottom, powell and Spencer present a racial version of a radical social
democratic reform strategy. Where the radical social democrats emphasized class
hierarchies, .powell and Spencer emphasize racial ones. 113 But like these social
democrats, powell and Spencer argue that the master hierarchy manifests itself in
all aspects of social life: education, employment, housing, health care, and so on.
For both, therefore, the response to omnipresent discrimination must be a
comprehensive redistribution of opportunities or resources. 114 Neither the radical
social democrats nor powell and Spencer believe that this comprehensive
redistribution can be accomplished all at once. That's why they are not
revolutionaries. But both insist that partial reforms anticipate as fully as possible
the final transformative outcome. That's a good part of what makes them
radical.1 15 Thus, powell and Spencer argue:
True integration, however, also requires metropolitan-wide strategies
that will deconcentrate poverty, integrate our neighborhoods, and equal-
ize wealth and opportunity.... We must also develop employment,
transportation and health care opportunities more equitably throughout
a region. This will require strong metropolitan governing bodies. In the
meantime, until we achieve integrated neighborhoods, we must recon-
sider retooled mandatory, metropolitan-wide desegregation plans-not
simply the good will of parents and districts to stem the increasing
resegregation of our schools. Only then can we move beyond voluntary
choice toward the transformative task of truly integrating. 116
Leaving aside the question of whether powell and Spencer have their
political monitors turned towards anything resembling the contemporary U.S.,
we have our doubts about the rigidity of their program and the corresponding
School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1990).
111. powell & Spencer, supra note 109, at 349-50.
112. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 300-04. See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND
ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
113. powell & Spencer, supra note 109, at 345.
114. Id. at 350.
115. Id. at 351.
116. Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
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rigidity of the strategy derived from it. The evidence to date, we argued in our
main Article, is that redistribution of resources by itself does not produce
educational improvement.' 17 powell and Spencer would presumably reply that
redistribution in favor of poor schools failed because it was not accompanied by
other elements of their deracializing, redistributivist program. 118 Unwillingness
to take this argument on faith, they seem to suggest, excludes us from the party
of racial progress. 119
But the story of perpetually provisional yet always corrigible school
reorganization told in our main Article teaches, we think, an entirely different
lesson about the possibilities of truly radical reform. That story, and experimen-
talism generally, suggest that there are ways of dislodging racial and other
hierarchies in which the redistribution of power and other resources is an
outcome, not the starting point and sole concern, of transformative ambitions. In
the experimentalist alternative, disciplined efforts actually to reconstruct failing
institutions enlarge the actors' sense of possibilities (including their sense of
what it means to have a deracialized society) and of strategic alliances (hence
their understanding of the politics of achieving such a society). The prospect is
thus of reform so truly radical that we cannot fully imagine what it will produce,
even if we can be reasonably confident all along the way that we are elaborating
and enriching our original commitments to a just society.
powell and Spencer will say that only a fatuous optimist or an apologist for
existing racial hierarchies could believe such a thing. But we think this reply
dogmatically dismisses what is most promising in current experience, as
inconclusive as it may be. On this point, moreover, we think that the exchange
here has produced something close to a (thin) consensus: Given the failures of
reform programs, including programs like the ones powell and Spencer advocate,
it is precisely to the thin reed of experimentalist school reform that many of us-
nomenclature, political differences, and estimates of success aside-are now
clinging.
117. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 3, at 204-05.
118. powell & Spencer, supra note 109, at 350-51.
119. Id. at 348-49.
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